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ABSTRACT
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making (TSCD) is introduced as 
an applied theory describing the way decision-makers experience a risk or crisis and 
prioritize their strategic communication responses to maintain positive relationships 
with their publics. Relational Dialectics Theory is applied to illustrate how tensions 
between organizations and publics influence communication decisions. The strategic 
messages used by the World Health Organization regarding the Zika virus mega-crisis 
provide a backdrop illustrating how TSCD is enacted. Theoretical and practical impli-
cations for decision-making suggest that TSCD contributes to a more robust under-
standing of how the changing context in a crisis prompts the prioritization of strategic 
messages.
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When risk or crisis situations occur, organizations find them-
selves in the position of needing to respond. The means by which 
they choose to address these situations has been labeled risk or 
crisis communication. Broadly, communication scholars have 
identified and assessed the risk and crisis communication used 
by organizations to reestablish or improve their image to recover 
from crises. Coombs and Holladay (1996) proposed, and Coombs 
(2007, 2012, 2013) further developed, a typology (Situational 
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Crisis Communication Theory), suggesting that if crisis types 
were identified in particular stages, and crisis managers under-
stood the kinds of crisis situations they were experiencing, their 
risk and crisis communication could be matched to the crisis type 
to enhance effectiveness. Benoit (1997, 2015, 2018) introduced, 
and subsequently expanded upon, image restoration/repair as the 
means to identify the different ways an entity could frame their 
crisis response and assess its effectiveness. Additionally, scholars 
have focused on the identification and assessment of particular 
risk and crisis communication choices made by organizations in 
crisis (e.g., Fearn-Banks, 2016; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002; Sellnow et 
al., 2009; Ulmer et al., 2018; Weick, 1993).
As would be expected, responses embodying best practices 
(Seeger, 2006) were determined to have helped organizations 
effectively manage their risk or crisis situations (Reierson et al., 
2009; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002; Sellnow et al., 2009), while other 
research revealed ineffective communication choices resulting 
from a reliance on routine procedures, delayed response, or failure 
to take ownership, to name a few bad practices (e.g., Cummings, 
1992; Farrell, 2015; Johnson, 2003). These and other studies ana-
lyzed risk and crisis situations after the fact and lacked a focus 
on the tensions that decision-makers within organizations expe-
rienced, no matter which communication strategy ultimately was 
chosen. This gap in addressing how decision-makers determine 
the communication strategies they choose to disseminate, and the 
call for “new approaches, theories, and insights about crisis and 
risk communication” (Liu, 2019, p. 9), is the focus of the present 
study exploring the processes of decision-making as a crisis situa-
tion unfolds. 
The identification and interaction of tensions or choices for 
decision-makers, manifested in strategic messages created in 
response to risk or crisis situations, represents a discursive strug-
gle, and is reflected in the prioritization of tensions through con-
tent. This discursive struggle reflects the change in prioritization 
within the strategic decision-making process that produces the 
communication disseminated from an organization as a crisis 
evolves. Understanding how decision-makers come to their choice 
of strategy is essential because it provides insight into the dynamic 
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context of a crisis as it moves from the pre-crisis phase to the 
post-crisis phase.
As such, the Tensions of Strategic Communication Deci-
sion-Making (TSCD) is introduced as an applied theory describ-
ing the way decision-makers experience a risk or crisis situation 
and prioritize the competing tensions shaping their strategic com-
munication responses in order to maintain positive relationships 
between themselves and their publics. In this essay, the theoretical 
origins of TSCD are presented, followed by the tenets and con-
ditions of TSCD. Using the strategic communication responses 
of the World Health Organization to the Zika virus, the utility of 




When a crisis presents itself, organizations and entities are con-
fronted with a set of circumstances and must respond accord-
ingly. The decision-makers in these circumstances can rely upon 
communication scholars to provide them with recommendations 
about what form of risk and crisis communication they should use 
to maximize their mitigation efforts. Reynolds and Seeger (2005) 
introduced Crisis Emergency Risk Communication as a model 
whereby publics could be educated, behaviors changed, informa-
tion and warnings made, and publics ultimately would be pre-
pared. Other scholars have offered similar strategies found to be 
successful in particular crisis situations (e.g., Avery, 2019; Bakker 
et al., 2019; Dowell, 2016; Stern, 2003), and have addressed the 
need for organizations to understand the kinds of crises they are 
confronting to select the matching persuasive tactics (Gribas et al., 
2018). However, what has been lacking in these studies is a focus 
on the dynamics of the decision-making process, particularly what 
happens when the crisis changes after the initial communication 
strategy has been introduced.
Some argue that a crisis becomes a threat to an organi-
zation when its decision-makers have not anticipated the 
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situation (Hermann & Dayton, 2009; Stern, 2003). For example, if 
decision-makers anticipate a crisis, they will have more time to 
engage others and be innovative in their response. If there is no 
time, decision-makers will follow their reflexes and reach closure 
quickly about how to manage the crisis. What research has sug-
gested is that instead of exploring a range of alternatives, policy-
makers:
are more likely to focus on one or two options rather than to explore 
a range of possible alternatives . . . and are likely to become involved 
in a number of credibility traps that limit their effectiveness with the 
media and public. (Hermann & Dayton, 2009, p. 238)
There are organizational risks if policymakers fail to consider the 
decision-making process before a crisis emerges. Those who do not 
consider the dynamic nature of a crisis and the process of deter-
mining a range of strategic communication choices are more likely 
to be ineffective in maintaining positive relationships (Gribas et 
al., 2018). Research shows that decision-makers have strong cog-
nitive biases (e.g., overconfidence, confirmation bias, and reliance 
on groupthink) that discourage them from thinking about risk and 
crisis situations until they happen (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). These 
decision-makers run the risk of not being able to adjust their com-
munication strategies as the situation changes because they have 
not considered their crisis response as a dynamic process (Boin et 
al., 2005).
Additionally, research has not explored what happens when 
crises change after an initial communication response has been 
implemented. Within risk and crisis communication, no the-
ory or explanation identifies the interplay or forces affecting the 
decision-making process. Decision theory is closest to what is 
occurring within an organization as management and leaders are 
“counseling . . . to make the most effective decision” (Fearn-Banks, 
2016, p. 19). The focus on identifying the communication strate-
gies considered as best practices has neglected the matter of how 
the decision-makers arrived at decisions as they experienced the 
stages of the crisis.
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Identification of Tensions
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making 
(TSCD) evolved from Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT). As 
Baxter (1990) described, tensions represent oppositional forces 
in an interpersonal relationship (e.g., closedness-openness, 
autonomy-connection, predictability-novelty), whose interaction 
can enable the individuals involved to maintain the relationship 
over time. Baxter and Simon (1993) clarified: “The natural path 
for all relationships is one of pressure toward change which results 
from the dynamic tensions of simultaneous opposing forces” 
(p. 226). Simply put, as the dynamic of a relationship changes, 
both parties need to adjust behaviors for relational maintenance.
Regarding the current study, Baxter (2011) broadened the 
application of RDT to clarify that discourses include competing 
themes within the message. Thus, “objects of analysis are the dis-
courses” (Baxter, 2011, p. 18). This characterization of discursive 
struggle and competing discourses suggests that tensions may be 
regarded as competing themes to be prioritized within the con-
struction of a crisis message.
In contrast to interpersonal relationships, Mumby (2005) 
approached dialectical tensions by identifying the vantage point 
of oppositional forces as they appeared in organizational settings. 
He based his views on the work of scholars who established con-
ditions by which the tensions and contradictions could be viewed 
interactively. As Mumby (2005) clarified: “With its focus on the 
indeterminacy of organizational meanings and practices, dialec-
tics refuses a monologic reading that reifies practice as either resis-
tant or dominant” (p. 38).
Mumby (2005) further extended RDT, examining its function 
in risk and crisis situations between organizations and their publics. 
These external relationships, “intersect in the moment to moment 
to produce complex and often contradictory dynamics of control 
and resistance” (Mumby, 2005, p. 21) and reflect similar opposi-
tional forces, herein after referred to as tensions. These tensions 
manifest themselves when a risk or crisis occurs and present the 
decision-makers with a range of choices about how to respond. To 
explore these oppositional forces, Littlefield et al. (2012) identified 
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seven tensions affecting relationships between organizations and 
their publics when confronting risk and crisis situations. Littlefield 
and Sellnow (2015) called for further examination of the interac-
tion of these tensions as a discursive struggle, as clarified by Baxter 
(2011) in the prioritization of the tensions within the ordering of 
the message.
The Use and Interaction of Tensions  
on Strategic Communication
In the context of risk and crisis communication, the relationship 
between an organization and its publics is maintained through 
strategic communication choices. As Seeger (2006) summarized, 
best practices are strategic choices found to be consistently help-
ful in navigating the relationship between organizations and their 
publics during risk and crisis events. However, our understand-
ing of these best practices expands by contending that their selec-
tion and use does not occur randomly. Rather, such selection is 
prompted by the identification and prioritization of tensions that 
arise during a risk or crisis. What follows are two propositions 
and their undergirding conditions that make up the tenets of the 
TSCD.
Proposition 1. Risk and crisis situations prompt dialectical tensions 
for decision-makers seeking to prevent or mitigate harm to them-
selves, their organization, or to their publics. 
Existing typologies reflect the model whereby risk and crisis 
situations occur, and organizations respond with communication 
strategies to mitigate the crisis. As an example, Coombs and Holla-
day (2002) demonstrated through SCCT that crisis types influence 
the selection of particular response strategies used to protect an 
organization’s reputation. This view later enabled Coombs (2014), 
and other scholars, to determine the effectiveness of strategies, 
but offered little insight into how the decision-makers arrived at 
the strategies they ultimately used. Similarly, as the dynamics of a 
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crisis change, the initial strategy used by an organization may need 
modification. The introduction of dialectical tensions into the 
model enables the decision-maker to modify an initial response 
based upon the prioritization of these tensions.
Condition 1. Dialectical tensions prompted by the risk and crisis 
are identifiable, mutually exclusive, interactive, and measurable on 
continuums representing oppositional dimensions. 
When crises occur, seven identifiable tensions emerge for 
decision-makers as they consider their responses (Littlefield 
et al., 2012). These tensions are mutually exclusive in that they 
utilize specific vocabulary pertaining to their point of focus. For 
example, timeliness pertains to the point in a crisis when the 
decision-makers weigh when to present information to various 
publics. Similarly, tensions are interactive because one tension 
may supersede another. It follows that the interaction of timeli-
ness and level of certainty might play out in the case where a CEO 
delayed the timing of a press conference due to uncertainty about 
information confirming whether the organization was responsible 
for the crisis. Finally, the tensions are measurable on continuums 
representing oppositional dimensions (e.g., full or partial disclo-
sure of information to little or no disclosure).
Condition 2. Tensions are not inherently prioritized for decision- 
makers in risk and crisis situations. 
The presence of seven tensions does not prioritize their level 
of importance because each risk or crisis is unique. Thus, when 
a crisis occurs, all the tensions are present in no apparent order. 
Each of the tensions poses a question for the decision-makers that 
must be addressed. The nature of the crisis will influence the way 
decision-makers choose to prioritize content strategically in the 
construction of their messages. The prioritization of tensions con-
stitutes what Baxter (2011) described as “the interplay of compet-
ing discourses” (p. 18).
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Timeliness Immediate to 
Never
Immediate: Messages are 
presented to publics upon learning 
information. 
Never: Messages are not presented 





Everything: Available information is 
fully disclosed to publics. 
Nothing: Available information is 





Verified: Organization expresses 
certainty of the information revealed 
to the publics. 
Unverified: Organization expresses 
uncertainty of the information 
revealed to the publics.
Interest Self-interest 
to Concern for 
Others
Self-interest: Message reflects a 
focus on prioritizing the interests of 
the organization over the interests 
of the publics. 
Concern for others: Message reflects 
a focus on prioritizing the interests 
of the publics over the interests of 
the organization.
Control of the 
Narrative
Total Control to 
No Control
Total Control: Organization 
maintains control of the messages/
narratives in the media. 
No Control: There are multiple 





Total Connection: Messages reflect a 
level of full sensitivity to the publics. 
No Connection: Messages reflect no 
level of sensitivity to the publics.
Level of 
Responsibility
All to None All: Organization claims full 
responsibility for the crisis. 
None: Organization denies 
responsibility for the crisis.
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TABLE 2 Audience-Focused Best Practices, Tensions, and Questions to 
Consider
Best Practices Tensions Questions to Consider






Control of the 
narrative
When should the 
organization be releasing 
information about the crisis 
to the media and the public?
How much information 
should the organization 
reveal to the media and the 
public? 
How much control of the 
crisis response narrative can 
the organization maintain 









How certain is the 
organization about the 









organization’s or the 
public’s—should be 
prioritized as the crisis is 
managed?
Pre-event planning and 
preparedness 





How much responsibility 
should the organization take 




Being candid, open, and 
honest with the public
Emotional 
connection
How much of an emotional 
connection should the 
organization maintain with 
the public?
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Condition 3. Tensions may cluster and intensify based upon the 
complexity of the crisis. 
While condition 2 suggests that every crisis prompts the 
emergence of tensions for decision-makers, tensions may cluster, 
resulting in a discursive struggle for prioritization. For example, 
when information about a crisis becomes available, the amount of 
information to be presented and who should present the informa-
tion may prompt prioritization. Later, once the decision-makers 
are more certain about the cause of the crisis, the tensions com-
prising level of responsibility, level of interest, and emotional con-
nection may cluster to reflect the interplay of discourses necessary 
to demonstrate the level of concern expressed by the organization 
for the publics impacted by a crisis. These clusters may present 
themselves at any time during the management of the crisis as 
decision-makers navigate their relationship with various publics.
Proposition 2. Strategic communication responses enacted by  
organizations are outcomes of the dialectical tensions identified and 
prioritized by decision-makers and acted upon by publics in risk 
and crisis situations. 
As risk and crisis situations occur, decision-makers have the 
capacity to frame how their messages are crafted in response to 
changing contexts. For example, Benoit’s (2015) image repair 
typology provided a means by which messages could be created 
in order to frame how they would be received (e.g., mortification, 
corrective action). Depending upon the context, decision-makers 
make choices, like how Goffman (1974) characterized and priori-
tized primary and social frameworks.
McCombs and Shaw (1972) labeled this prioritization pro-
cess for the mass media as “the agenda-setting function” (p. 176). 
Through agenda-setting, the media not only provide informa-
tion (primary framework) for the publics, but also through their 
placement of the information (social frameworks), determine its 
importance. Similarly, in the context of risk and crisis, decision- 
makers have the capacity to frame how their strategic messages 
are crafted for publics in response to changing contexts. It is in 
response to how publics respond to messages that Perelman and 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1971) identified the presence of universal 
and particular audiences. They suggested that with multiple pub-
lics, decision-makers must be conscious about how their messages 
may be perceived by all publics to determine their effectiveness.
Condition 4. The perceptions of decision-makers about the prioriti-
zation of competing discourses may shift during a crisis resulting in 
an interpenetration of tensions reflecting the decision-makers’ use 
of the central issue of power (dominant to marginal) to prioritize 
message content. 
In the pre-crisis phase, strategic decision-makers may respond 
with messages to prevent or control a crisis from materializing. 
For example, to discourage people from spreading a contagious 
virus, public health decision-makers initially may use an interplay 
of the Surgeon General (prioritizing the control of the narrative) 
providing information (prioritizing the amount of information) 
demonstrating certainty about the relationship of wearing a mask 
and social distancing to the prevention of spreading the virus (pri-
oritizing the level of certainty). However, once a virus has been 
detected within a population, public health officials may margin-
alize their earlier discourses that emphasized early prevention and 
treatment (prioritizing timeliness), suggesting ways to deal with 
the effects of the virus (prioritizing the level of interest), and show-
ing sensitivity toward the patients and families of victims of the 
virus (prioritizing their emotional connection).
Condition 5. The utilization of the best practices of risk and crisis 
communication enhances public perceptions of the strategic com-
munication and the management of the risk and crisis. 
Seeger (2006) and others suggested that when organizations 
utilize best practices, the affected publics perceive their efforts 
more positively (McKnight & Linnenluecke, 2016; Veil et al., 
2020). Thus, decision-makers may respond to the tensions by 
choosing, from among the best practices, those that are primar-
ily audience-focused (Littlefield, 2013) (See Table 2). For example, 
being accessible to the media and publics is a best practice associ-
ated with timeliness, amount of information, and level of certainty. 
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Being empathetic and sincere with publics is associated with the 
focus of interest and emotional connection.
Condition 6. The relational intent of the decision-makers toward 
publics modifies the prioritization of tensions and the implementa-
tion of strategic communication choices. 
This condition presents itself when risk or crisis decision- 
makers initially may have chosen a communication strategy not 
well-received by publics. For example, decision-makers may not 
have prioritized the importance of controlling the narrative at the 
start of the crisis, allowing for the emergence of multiple spokes-
persons presenting conflicting information. Upon perceiving 
the deteriorating support of their position with affected publics, 
decision-makers may later prioritize the controlling of the narra-
tive and identify one credible and respected authority to speak on 
their behalf.
These propositions and conditions constitute the Tensions of 
Strategic Communication Decision-Making (TSCD) and sug-
gest that decision-makers identify particular tensions, prioritize 
the tensions within the themes of the discourse based upon the 
context of the risk or crisis situation, and respond with strategic 
communication choices based upon their prioritization. This stra-
tegic communication may represent a broad range of choices, with 
effectiveness determined by how well the messages are received 
and measured by the publics involved.
Method
To illustrate the descriptive power of TSCD, a case study approach 
using a contemporary mega-crisis was identified. Case studies com-
monly are used when studying risk and crisis situations (Sellnow 
et al., 2009). Additionally, Baxter (2011) supported qualitative or 
interpretive methods as appropriate to examine “the interplay of 
competing discourses” (p. 18) and called on researchers studying 
RDT to use “a variety of methods to understand both the culture 
and the relational history in which a [text] is embedded” (p. 159).
Some scholars have described mega-crises as large-scale events 
or risks that may create significant, ongoing, and even existential 
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threats to communities, groups, and organizations (Helsloot et al., 
2012; Yen & Salmon, 2017). The Zika crisis was identified as the 
mega-crisis in the present study for several reasons. First, the Zika 
virus crossed geographic boundaries (Romero, 2016). In addi-
tion, Zika constituted an international public health emergency. 
Prior to the Zika virus, it was only the fourth time the WHO had 
issued such a warning (previous alerts were for Ebola, Swine Flu, 
and Polio), and the first time for a mosquito-borne illness (Vick-
ery, 2016). Finally, the Zika virus represented a threat due to the 
absence of immunity in the whole of Latin America and the Carib-
bean (Duffy & Brasileiro, 2016).
The Case
The selected crisis—the Zika virus and its effect on humans, and 
especially pregnant women—provided a backdrop for an illustra-
tion of how decision-makers strategically responded in a crisis. 
The contextual background for this study was drawn from a Lexis-
Nexis search of several hundred newspapers, magazines, and other 
online sources, beginning when the virus was first detected in 1947 
until February 2016 when a state of crisis was declared in several 
Latin American countries, as well as in several parts of the United 
States of America. A total of 136 news articles were selected by 
removing duplicates and including only those that specifically 
included information pertinent to the emerging 2016 Zika virus 
on the American continents.
Data Set
The data set included public communication messages designated 
as “Disease Outbreak News” by the WHO on its official website, as 
the Zika virus was emerging as a major health crisis from October 
2015 to February 2016. Baxter (2011) described this type of data 
as dialogically expansive because of the multiple themes or dis-
courses interacting within the messages over time. Twenty-four 
official reports were collected from the WHO website during this 
period, with paragraphs serving as the unit of analysis. The num-




The 24 WHO messages were ordered chronologically to reveal 
the progression of strategic communication responses. The para-
graphs in each message were numbered sequentially (1, 2, 3 . . .) 
following the agenda-setting technique known as the inverted pyr-
amid style of writing whereby the most important information is 
placed first in the news story (Harrower, 2012). Each paragraph 
was coded by two researchers to identify the presence and level of 
one or more tensions in its content, along with how the content 
of each paragraph revealed dialectical tensions associated with 
elements of the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2. The coders 
found 100% agreement (Neuendorf, 2002) on the identification 
of all tensions, with the exception of the level of responsibility. In 
that case, the coders initially found 70% agreement. Subsequently, 
through discussion of the different levels (e.g., individual, state) 
consensus was achieved.
Content was noted by specific descriptors and coded accord-
ingly. For example, if the data specified, “we wanted to get this 
information out immediately to the publics,” the data were coded 
as prioritizing timeliness. If the data specified, “we are unsure at 
this time about the cause of the birth defects of children born of 
women who contracted the virus,” the data were coded as margin-
alizing the level of certainty.
The 136 news articles providing contextual information about 
Zika virus were read by the lead researcher multiple times to iden-
tify elements associated with the conditions in Proposition 2. 
Those articles directly quoting individuals or official spokesper-
sons were identified and their remarks were chosen as exemplars 
reflecting public opinion as reported by the media.
Results
Proposition 1. Condition 1
Proposition 1 claims that risk and crisis situations prompt dialec-
tical tensions for decision-makers seeking to prevent or mitigate 
harm to themselves or to their publics. To validate this proposi-
tion, Condition 1 suggests that dialectical tensions are identifiable, 
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mutually exclusive, interactive, and measurable on continuums 
representing levels of oppositional dimensions. The data revealed 
evidence of the seven tensions in all 24 messages, where they were 
found to be mutually exclusive as evident by coder agreement, 
interactive by virtue of multiple tensions being identified in one or 
more paragraphs, and oppositional.
Timeliness (Immediate to Never)
All 24 messages included the immediacy of timeliness in their first 
paragraphs by citing the specific date when WHO identified a case 
of Zika virus, with 83.33% of the messages being published within 
9 days of the specific date identified in paragraph 1. For example, a 
message published on January 27 cited January 23 in paragraph 1 
(difference of 4 days) as the date when Zika was detected.
Amount of Information (Everything to None)
Sixteen of the messages included some amount of content in one 
or more paragraphs about the Zika virus and/or ways to prevent 
exposure, while eight provided no background information (e.g., 
history of the virus, where Zika had been clinically identified) or 
mitigation strategies (e.g., what people should wear or do to avoid 
contracting the virus).
Certainty of Information (Verified to Unverified)
All 24 messages included indicators of certainty by mentioning 
laboratory confirmed or unconfirmed cases of Zika. Nineteen 
(70.16%) prioritized laboratory confirmation of Zika in paragraph 
1, with an additional 10 messages providing certainty in paragraph 
2. Four messages included paragraphs mentioning varying lev-
els of uncertainty related to the Zika virus. For example, “despite 
reports of a potential association between Zika virus and micro-
cephaly (e.g., a rare neurological condition where a baby’s head 
is much smaller than expected) and other neurological disorders, 
a causal relationship between these events has not yet been con-
firmed” (WHO, 2016a).
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Control of the Narrative (Total Control to No Control) 
All 24 messages included paragraphs with WHO pronounce-
ments, protocol, plans, or other authoritative recommendations. 
For example, WHO controlled the narrative by being the agency 
receiving reports identifying detection of the Zika virus infections. 
The use of the phrase, “WHO recommends . . .” in more than half 
of the messages demonstrated the control WHO exercised regard-
ing its strategic communication, and it was WHO that reported 
what was being done to counter or prevent the effects of Zika virus. 
One message referenced another agency—the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC)—as providing the confirmatory 
test to identify the presence of the Zika virus.
Level of Responsibility (All to None). 
The messages included the identification of those entities who 
should be responsible for acting. Three messages prioritized the 
WHO as being responsible to oversee the detection and prevention 
activities of its member states and to provide technical orienta-
tion for appropriate pesticide use. Seventeen messages prioritized 
specific country governments (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador) 
as being responsible to detect, prevent, and help with potential 
victims of the Zika virus. One message indicated that pregnant 
women were responsible for taking their own preventive action. 
Four messages did not place responsibility for action on any entity.
Focus of Interest (Self-Interest to Concern for Others).
In 23 of the messages, the content prioritized the focus of interest 
on those other than the decision-maker (WHO). In other words, 
the warnings were directed at potential victims of the Zika virus, 
particularly “people traveling to high risk areas, especially preg-
nant women,” young children, and the elderly (WHO, 2016a). 
Only one of the messages did not direct the focus of interest to self 
or others.
Emotional Connection (Total Connection to No Connection). 
In this category, the identification of vulnerable groups, the use of 
language choices reflecting cultural sensitivity, and efforts to reach 
out to provide support for victims were prioritized in varying 
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degrees. Ten of the messages did not provide any mention of these 
elements. In fact, no emotional connection was offered in the first 
nine messages (October 21 to December 21, 2016) included in 
the data set. However, after this initial period, the subsequent 14 
messages included varying levels of reference to vulnerable groups 
(especially pregnant women, children, and the elderly), areas of 
high risk (Central and South America), language sensitivity, and 
victim support.
Proposition 1. Condition 2
Condition 2 validates Proposition 1 by suggesting that responses 
to tensions are not inherently prioritized for decision-makers in 
risk and crisis situations. In the present study, content reflecting 
all seven tensions was found in the 24 messages under review. 
However, their prioritized placement varied in the messages as the 
spread of the virus increased. Specifically, when considering the 
content of the dominant discourses prioritized in the first para-
graphs of the 24 messages, the following tensions were identified: 
Timeliness—100%, level of certainty—79%, level of responsibil-
ity—21%, amount of information—8%, and control of the nar-
rative—4%. The discourses marginalized by omission in the first 
paragraphs included focus of interest and emotional connection. 
In contrast, even as the crisis progressed, the discourses associ-
ated with two tensions (control of the narrative—96% and focus of 
interest—33%) were marginalized until the last paragraphs of each 
of the 24 messages. Finally, the discourse associated with emo-
tional connection consistently was marginalized to the final two 
paragraphs in 12 of the messages (50%).
Proposition 1. Condition 3
Condition 3 provides clarification for Proposition 1 by identifying 
that tensions cluster and change in priority prompted by the com-
plexity of the crisis. The data revealed the clustering of tensions 
at all stages of the crisis under investigation. For example, at the 
beginning of the crisis, skepticism about the spread and implica-
tions of the Zika virus confronted decision-makers. This prompted 
the WHO to prioritize two tensions: getting the message out to 
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affected publics (timeliness) and providing verification that the 
Zika virus was being clinically detected (certainty). The dominance 
of these tensions prompted decision-makers to include up-to-date 
and scientifically confirmed content at or near the beginning of all 
24 messages in the ongoing discourse of the WHO.
Because the priority for decision-makers was on timing and 
certainty, the emphasis on those groups being affected by the virus 
was marginalized by omission from the beginning of the messages. 
Thus, while the WHO messages always addressed the welfare of 
those who had contracted the Zika virus (focus of interest), the 
interplay of messages with specific references to vulnerable people 
(e.g., pregnant women, children born with microcephaly, people 
living in poverty) using culturally-sensitive strategies (emotional 
connection) took 2 months of changing contexts to become more 
prominent in the messages.
Proposition 2. Condition 4
Proposition 2 describes how the strategic communication responses 
enacted by organizations are prioritized by decision-makers and 
acted upon by publics in risk and crisis situations. In Condition 
4, as the perceptions of decision-makers about the prioritization 
of tensions shifted, different strategic communication responses 
were enacted. For example, while the prioritization of immediacy 
resulted in the maintenance of a consistent communication strat-
egy to get the information out as quickly as possible following the 
identification of the Zika virus in a particular area, the discourse 
associated with prioritizing the other-serving focus of interest 
shifted throughout the crisis.
In the pre-crisis stage, strategic communication responses 
were preventive. For example, following the WHO’s prioritization, 
pre-crisis messages came in the form of general warnings or sug-
gested prevention strategies: “Public Health Agency of Canada . . . 
recommends that pregnant women discuss any travel plans with 
their health care providers” (Ubelacker, 2016). Later, when the 
crisis grew in scope and people continued to travel to high risk 
regions, the messages became more explicit: “These steps include 
wearing insect repellent, using air conditioning or window and 
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door screens to keep mosquitoes outside, wearing long pants and 
long-sleeved shirts when possible, and emptying standing water 
inside and outside the home” (“Washington: CDC warns,” 2016).
Regarding the prioritization of information to reveal how the 
Zika virus spread, as scientists became more certain, more specific 
information was forthcoming and placed earlier in the messages. 
For example, the initial transmission of the Zika virus was traced 
to the bite of the Aedes aegypti mosquito. This prompted the pri-
oritization of that content in the messages (13 messages included 
this content in the first half of the paragraphs) to “reduce the mos-
quitoes that transmit this disease” (WHO, 2015b). When it was 
later detected that Zika could be transmitted through sexual inter-
course (WHO, 2016b), content was prioritized to identify meth-
ods of birth control (e.g., abstinence, use of condoms).
Proposition 2. Condition 5
Condition 5 explains how Proposition 2 is acted upon by publics 
because the utilization of best practices enhances public percep-
tions of the prioritized strategic communication in risk and crisis 
situations. In the present study, the uncertainty associated with 
the Zika virus and microcephaly illustrated this relationship. As 
the connection between the Zika virus and microcephaly became 
more certain, women who were pregnant or were anticipating preg-
nancy became more anxious, as the following statement demon-
strated: “All of the women I see at the hospital or in my office who 
are pregnant or wanting to get pregnant are very alarmed, almost 
panicky” (“Brazil fears birth defects,” 2016).
The extreme reactions of women prompted decision- 
makers to prioritize strategic messages reflecting the best prac-
tices of hearing and understanding publics’ concerns (tensions of 
emotional connection and prioritization of interest) and accepting 
uncertainty and ambiguity (tension of confidence in information). 
The WHO prioritized the following specific strategies: “To pro-
vide self-efficacy for those at risk or already infected with the Zika 
virus” (WHO, 2015d); to address the presence or absence of cer-
tainty (WHO, 2015c); and by withholding total certainty about the 
link between the Zika virus and microcephaly (Goodhue, 2016).
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By foregrounding content about the confirmation process for 
publics, decision-makers enacted the best practice of being can-
did, open, and honest. Through collaboration and coordination 
with the CDC, WHO prioritized content supporting its advisory 
warning that travel should be postponed for pregnant women, or 
women anticipating pregnancy, due to the risk of a relationship 
between the virus and the birth defect. These warnings were heard, 
and people’s reactions were those of adherence (Umeha, 2016).
Proposition 2. Condition 6
Proposition 2 is understood further because in Condition 6 the 
relational intent of decision-makers with the publics modifies 
the interplay of tensions and the prioritization of strategic com-
munication choices. In most cases, relational intent best can be 
described as helpful, hurtful, or neutral. Littlefield and Sellnow 
(2015) described these intents, suggesting that a neutral intent also 
may be hurtful when decision-makers do not respond to the ten-
sion of level of responsibility and take some form of action.
In the case of the Zika virus, all of the WHO messages except 
one prioritized a response to the tension of level of interest, with 
a focus on helping the publics to avoid contracting the virus and 
potentially affecting the health of unborn fetuses. In the one mes-
sage where a neutral intent was coded, WHO identified geographic 
areas as the focus of interest, as the virus was “spreading geograph-
ically to previously unaffected areas” (WHO, 2016a).
Additionally, as the crisis intensified, the helpful content pri-
oritized by the decision-makers shifted to respond to the potential 
health hazards for pregnant women and their unborn fetuses. For 
example, when prioritized content described the threat of the Zika 
as “virus consisting of mild fever, rash . . . , headaches, arthral-
gia, myalgia, asthenia, and non-purulent conjunctivitis, occur-
ring three to twelve days after the mosquito vector bite” (WHO, 
2015a), the discourses were designed to encourage women to 
delay or cancel travel to areas of risk. As more became known 
about the possible link between Zika and microcephaly, design-
ing messages that prioritized the strategy of advising women to 
avoid pregnancy by abstinence or the use of contraceptives repre-
sented a more intrusive approach to controlling the spread of the 
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making 231
virus. This recommendation to avoid pregnancy was not valued 
universally, as it represented what decision-makers in the Catholic 
Church characterized as a hurtful intent (Partlow, 2016).
Discussion
The analysis of strategic communication decision-making during 
the Zika virus mega-crisis illustrates the utility of TSCD to enhance 
our understanding of the processes at work when decision- 
makers construct messages reflecting a discursive struggle during 
the ongoing phases of a risk or crisis event. The responses of WHO 
provided insight into how the crisis context likely influenced the 
prioritizing of messages reflecting the competing tensions. This 
application of TSCD provides theoretical and practical implica-
tions for scholars and risk and crisis decision-makers.
Theoretical Implications
This study fills a void in the literature by providing a clearer focus 
on the dynamics of the decision-making process in changing cri-
sis situations after the initial communication strategies have been 
implemented. As Ha and Boynton (2014) suggested, the focus of 
research has rarely been on those who make the decisions even 
though crisis decisions are made by leaders in an environment of 
competing messages (Boin et al., 2005). By accounting for the ten-
sions experienced by the decision-makers as they make sense of a 
crisis, this study contends that such an analysis reveals more clearly 
how organizational leaders prioritize the range of their communi-
cation choices when developing messages for different publics. In 
addition, a more robust understanding is possible regarding how 
strategic choices are made and modified throughout the phases of 
a crisis (Hermann & Dayton, 2009).
This unique application of the interpersonal relational dialec-
tics theory to risk and crisis provides for a deeper understand-
ing of how decision-makers must respond to a crisis as a dynamic 
event—whereby communication strategies must change as a 
result of changing circumstances—and organizations maintain 
or rebuild positive relationships with their publics. Through an 
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analysis of discursive messages prioritizing responses to prevent 
or mitigate a crisis, researchers can account for the prioritization 
and interplay of those tensions on changing messages as the crisis 
unfolds (Gribas et al., 2018).
The interplay of the competing discourses within messages 
and the necessary prioritization of decision-makers as they con-
front what Baxter (2011) labeled “turning points” or “moments of 
change” (p. 154), illustrate the complexity involved in the process 
of message creation in a dynamic context of crisis. Essentially, the 
changing crisis context prompts changes in the prioritization of 
discourses within the messages, just as the changing dynamics in 
an interpersonal relationship necessitate oppositional responses to 
alter the situation.
While the introduction of competing discourses prompts con-
tradictory responses (Baxter, 2011), this study reinforces the posi-
tion that competing discourses can be identified through content, 
and, thereby through placement, reflect the prioritization of the 
decision-maker for the publics. Through this interplay of the com-
peting discourses, Baxter (2011) suggested that meaning is cre-
ated. By focusing on the prioritization of discourses within risk or 
crisis messages, the processes of decision-making may be revealed 
more fully.
This study extends the theoretical understanding of decision- 
making by illustrating the dynamic discursive struggle of all seven 
tensions within the ongoing risk and crisis messages and the subse-
quent best practices used by decision-makers in risk or crisis con-
texts. Accepting Baxter’s (2011) broader characterization—that 
competing discourses within a message (e.g., tensions) may be the 
objects of analysis—enabled this study to use tensions as represen-
tations of discourses prioritized by decision-makers based upon 
where content addressing these tensions was placed within the 
messages. Particularly, the findings revealed the interactive nature 
of the tensions as their prioritization within the messages changed 
when the risk or crisis context moved through the crisis phases. 
By revealing the discursive struggle reflecting the prioritized ten-
sions within the risk or crisis messages, this study helps scholars to 
understand the processes associated with decision-making within 
the changing context of a risk or crisis.
The Tensions of Strategic Communication Decision-Making 233
Practical Implications
This study offers several practical implications for risk and crisis 
communication scholars and decision-makers. Initially, TSCD 
provides a frame of reference for examining and organizing each 
of the seven tensions experienced by all decision-makers. In cri-
sis situations, spokespeople such as Public Information Officers 
respond because, through communication, they can describe, 
interpret, and evaluate what is happening for their stakeholders 
and publics (Avery, 2019). Furthermore, understanding these ten-
sions could help emergency managers and others develop crisis 
simulations and other drills to help better prepare crisis managers 
to communicate well during a crisis. As decision-makers create 
their strategic messages, they prioritize their competing discourses 
in the message based upon which tensions they perceive to be of 
greatest importance to the publics.
By using the continuums associated with each of the ten-
sions, decision-makers prioritize the levels of openness or cer-
tainty, the amounts of information to share, and degrees to which 
they assumed responsibility, expressed concern, or directed their 
focus of interest. In addition, the interplay between the tensions is 
observable as the crisis evolves when certain tensions take prece-
dence and are prioritized by the decision-makers in their strategic 
messages. By identifying tensions as discursive messages (Baxter, 
2011), the TSCD theory provides clues regarding why particu-
lar best practices should be used when communicating about the 
phases of the crisis as the tensions cluster in different combina-
tions. 
Previous research in risk and crisis communication has retro-
spectively provided researchers and practitioners the opportunity 
to identify emerging best practices and to evaluate their effective-
ness in preventing, mitigating, or renewing after crisis situations 
(e.g., Lachlan et al., 2018; Stewart & Young, 2018; Ulmer et al., 
2018). In contrast, the utility of recognizing the tensions con-
fronting decision-makers prior to the selection of particular best 
practices helps scholars to explore new aspects of risk and crisis 
communication as the prioritization of tensions shifts during cri-
sis, producing interaction that may or may not make the adoption 
of particular best practices an option for future decision-makers. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This TSCD theory is exploratory and not without limitations. In 
this study, the identification of tensions of strategic communica-
tion decision-making about a mega-crisis came from written mes-
sages that were posted by the WHO on their website. While Baxter 
(2011) affirmed the study of “contrasting discourses . . . in spo-
ken or written texts” (p. 152), to understand more robustly how 
decision-makers experience and prioritize tensions, scholars may 
learn more if they extend the parameters of the search, gathering 
responses from multiple mediums as a crisis unfolds and working 
directly with decision-makers (e.g., interviews, observations, or 
surveys).
A second limitation of this study is its single mega-crisis focus. 
While helpful in an exploratory way, TSCD’s applicability to a 
variety of different crisis contexts simultaneously would add value 
and veracity to its legitimacy. For example, the novel coronavirus 
COVID-19 in 2020 is a fertile area of study where politics, eco-
nomics, sociology, education, and family systems offer numerous 
inter-related contexts whereby the prioritization and interplay of 
tensions could reveal a range of effective and ineffective communi-
cation strategies used by decision-makers in an attempt to retain or 
rebuild relationships with multiple publics. Similarly, TSCD could 
be used to analyze ongoing crises involving food safety, environ-
mental security, domestic acts of violence, mass shootings, and 
many other social issues. The next step for researchers is to find 
ways to test the propositions and conditions, thereby confirming 
or disproving TSCD’s theoretical assumptions.
Finally, the impact of the cultural context in a crisis on pub-
lics responsiveness to strategic communication choices requires 
more robust examination. As such, within every crisis are cultural 
variables affecting the relationship between the decision-makers 
and their publics. How the decision-makers choose to strategically 
communicate with their publics in times of crisis will influence 
how their messages are received (Littlefield, 2013).
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Conclusion
This exploratory study introduced an applied theory describing 
the processes associated with message creation by decision-makers 
in risk and crisis situations; identifying how the tensions present 
themselves, how they influence the prioritization of strategic com-
munication responses, and how their interaction with best prac-
tices is affected by the context in which they are introduced. By 
being attentive to these inherent tensions, scholars and observers 
may better understand how their responses to manage complex 
and challenging risk and crisis situations may be more strategically 
utilized in the future.
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